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Abstract. Computers that negotiate on our behalf hold great promise
for the future and will even become indispensable in emerging application
domains such as the smart grid, autonomous driving, and the Internet of
Things. Much research has thus been expended to create agents that are
able to negotiate in an abundance of circumstances. However, up until
now, truly autonomous negotiators have rarely been deployed in real-
world applications. This paper sizes up current negotiating agents and
explores a number of technological, societal and ethical challenges that
autonomous negotiation systems are bringing about. The questions we
address are: in what sense are these systems autonomous, what has been
holding back their further proliferation, and is their spread something
we should encourage? We relate the automated negotiation research
agenda to dimensions of autonomy and distill three major themes that we
believe will propel autonomous negotiation forward: accurate represen-
tation, long-term perspective, and user trust. We argue these orthogonal
research directions need to be aligned and advanced in unison to sustain
tangible progress in the field.
1 Introduction
Negotiation, the process of joint decision making, is pervasive in our society [35].
Whenever actors meet and influence each other to forge a mutually beneficial
agreement, a form of negotiation is at work [76].
Negotiation arises in almost every social and organizational setting, yet many
avoid it out of fear or lack of skill and this contributes to income inequality [9],
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political gridlock [34] and social injustice [26]. This has led to an increasing
focus on the design of autonomous negotiators capable of automatically and
independently negotiating with others. This interest has been spurred since the
beginning of the 1980s with the work of early pioneers such as Smith [66] and
Sycara [67].
Automated negotiation research is fueled by a number of benefits that com-
puterized negotiation can offer, including better (win-win) deals, and reduc-
tion in time, costs, stress and cognitive effort on the part of the user. More-
over, autonomous negotiation will soon become not just desired but required
in instances where the human scale is simply too slow and expensive. For
instance, with the world-wide deployment of the smart electrical grid and the
must for renewable energy sources, flexible devices in our household will soon
(re-)negotiate complex energy contracts automatically. Another example is the
rise of the Internet of Things (IoT), which will introduce countless smart, inter-
connected devices that autonomously negotiate the usage of sensitive data and
make trade-offs between privacy concerns, price, and convenience.
To properly fulfill its representational role in an ever-dynamic environment, a
negotiation agent has to balance and adhere to different aspects of autonomous
behavior, including self-reliance and the capability and freedom to perform its
actions, while at the same time remaining interdependent in its joint activity with
the user. While many successes have been achieved in advancing various degrees
of autonomy in negotiating agents, it is readily apparent that fully-deployed
and truly autonomous negotiators are still a thing of the future. Continued
development will be required before agents will be able to forge even mundane
agreements such as the personalized renewal of our energy or mobile phone
contracts. This begs the obvious question: what is still lacking currently and
what is needed for autonomous negotiators to be able to fulfill their promise?
This paper discusses the challenges and upcoming application domains for
(almost) entirely autonomous negotiation on people’s behalf, extending the
vision set out in [8]. We describe the technological challenges associated with
these future domains and provide a roadmap towards full autonomy, together
with stops along the way, highlighting what we deem important solution con-
cepts for enabling future autonomous negotiation systems. As a basis for our
discussion, we provide a unifying view of autonomous negotiation based on three
orthogonal dimensions of autonomy that research has focused on so far: being
self-sufficient, self-directed, and interdependent. We argue that automated nego-
tiation opportunities of tomorrow are calling for a combined effort to address
these three pillars of a negotiator’s autonomy.
This paper does not aim to survey all research or challenges in the field
comprehensively, but rather presents pointers to what we consider important
focal points for autonomous negotiation, now and in the future. We pinpoint
and elaborate on the following major challenges for autonomous negotiation:
1. Domain knowledge and preference elicitation;
2. Long-term perspective; and
3. User trust and adoption.
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Lastly, this paper also pays homage to the 2001 landmark publication by Jen-
nings et al. [42] and asks what has happened, 16 years later, with the prospects
and challenges of automated negotiation. We examine which main challenges
have been addressed, and which stay relevant in a world that offers more oppor-
tunities for automated negotiation than ever before.
2 The Autonomy Diagonal of Negotiation
Autonomous negotiation is more than just automated negotiation; it is the free-
dom to negotiate independently. Rather than being uni-dimensional, autonomy
incorporates at least two components [14]: self-sufficiency (the capability of the
actor to take care of itself) and self-directedness (the freedom to act within the
environment and the means to reach goals). Following [44] we distinguish a third
dimension called support for interdependence – being able to work with others
and influence and be influenced by team members.1
We can distinguish three strands of research in automated negotiation that
each cluster around one of the three dimensions of autonomy (Fig. 1):
Self-sufficient: Game theoretical approaches and trading bots. The the-
ory of games is a principal tool for studying negotiation and bargaining [72,76].
Game theory’s dominant concern is with fully rational players and what each
should optimally do. This approach is therefore called symmetrically prescrip-
tive [63]. The focus is on either equilibrium strategies or protocols that can guar-
antee a good outcome for both players through mechanism design [76]. Agents
have a reduced scope for self-directedness in such settings, as they are rela-
tively simple and need to conform to certain strategies (e.g. to bid truthfully in
an auction). Similarly, real-world trading bots mostly employ simple rule-based
functions which have been hard-coded in advance. Examples of this type are
among the most advanced autonomous negotiators in terms of self-sufficiency,
such as high frequency trading agents for financial and advertising exchanges,
and sniping agents used in eBay that place bids at the last possible second [39].
While these approaches are able to function without human intervention and
can be highly self-sufficient, they are constrained in terms of freedom to direct
the process.
Self-directed: Negotiation analytical approaches. Negotiation analysis
prescribes how players should act given a description of how others will act.
That is, this field is concerned with an asymmetrical prescriptive/descriptive
view of autonomous negotiation [63]. Much research on what are often dubbed
simply ‘negotiation agents’ (or ‘heuristics’ in game theory literature) falls into
1 Note that the notion of autonomy is notoriously difficult to capture (see [44] for an
overview). We are concerned here with those aspects especially relevant for nego-
tiation and for their autonomy in relation to their environment; an alternative,
more self-contained definition, for example, is an agent’s ability to generate its own
goals [51].
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Fig. 1. By and large, negotiation research can be clustered around one of the three
main orthogonal dimensions of autonomy: self-sufficiency, self-directedness, and inter-
dependence. The efforts of the three need to be integrated to arrive at truly autonomous
negotiators that can progress along the autonomy diagonal.
this category; e.g. all negotiation agents from the annual automated negotia-
tion competition [5]. A key feature of this approach is the agent’s ability to
make judgment calls without intervention (i.e. to construct beliefs based on par-
tial information and act in best response to these beliefs, typically over opponent
types or strategies), while the agent’s preferences are often considered externally
given. This locates the negotiation analytical approach around the self-directed
axis.
Interdependent: Negotiation support systems. Negotiation support sys-
tems are designed to assist and train people in negotiation. Some of these sys-
tems, such as the Inspire system [45], have been widely employed in real-life.
However, while negotiation support systems enable interdependence by design,
humans predominately supervise and make decisions on the appropriate out-
come, which results in low self-sufficiency and self-directedness.
As can be gleaned from the fields indicated above, autonomous negotiation
has garnered attention from different research directions and has managed to
advance in key aspects of autonomous behavior. As a result, we now have nego-
tiators that exist independently of their owner in the real world, delegated with
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a gamut of available strategies to freely choose among, and with the ability to
engage in supportive interdependence; just not all at the same time.
The varied set of requirements for adequately autonomous negotiation may
explain why it has proven difficult to extend the progress made in this field
to truly representative negotiating agents. Of course we acknowledge that to a
lesser degree, combined work on all dimensions has been performed (as depicted
by the three-colored cube in Fig. 1); we simply argue that the main automated
negotiation research lines have developed in parallel to one of the three autonomy
directions. Research-wise, it is unquestionably a sound strategy to first explore
the autonomy axes in separation. As Fig. 1 suggests, we can make substantive
progress in autonomous negotiation by continuing to advance along the autonomy
diagonal, which has inspired the focal points of the challenges we present in the
next section (as summarized in Table 1).
Table 1. Overview of major challenges in autonomous negotiation and the main dimen-
sions of autonomy to which they relate. Each challenge is subdivided in building blocks
along with a solution roadmap and illustrative example applications.
Domain knowledge and preference elicitation (Sect. 3.1)
Addressing self-sufficiency & interdependence
Building blocks Solutions roadmap Applications
Preference
elicitation on-the-fly
Value of information
indicators, robust
performance estimates
Privacy and IoT
Domain modeling Separate user/agent domain
models, expert mappings
Smart grids
Long-term perspective (Sect. 3.2)
Addressing self-sufficiency & self-directedness
Building blocks Solutions roadmap Applications
Repeated
interactions
Temporally integrative
negotiations, reputation
metrics
Communities, smart
homes, autonomous
driving
Non-stationary
preferences
Cost-efficient tracking,
context-dependent models,
preference dynamics
B2B, entertainment
booking
User trust and adoption (Sect. 3.3)
Addressing self-directedness & interdependence
Building blocks Solutions roadmap Applications
Acceptability and
participation
Co-creation, adjustable
autonomy, transfer of control
Conflict resolution,
customer retainment
Transparent
consequences
Transparency and openness,
worst-case bounds, risk
measures
Sharing economy,
decentralized
marketplaces
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3 Major Challenges
The various aspects of autonomy drive three major open challenges for
autonomous negotiation, of which the overall theme can be summarized as
trusted and sustained representation. We describe the challenges and their build-
ing blocks below, together with a number of explicit opportunities in each case
(see Table 1 for an overview).
Note that many of these challenges intersect and cannot be entirely untan-
gled; for example, adequate user preference extraction will not only increase the
user model accuracy, but may also boost user trust. Therefore, just like auton-
omy itself, each challenge outlined here is multi-dimensional ; i.e., each challenge
pertains to at least two dimensions of autonomy, thereby providing the impetus
to further advance along the autonomy diagonal.
3.1 Domain Knowledge and Preference Elicitation
A negotiation domain typically admits contracts that consist of multiple
issues (e.g. price, amount, quality of service). The specific structure of a
domain together with the user preferences associated with its outcomes (pre-
scribed by e.g. a utility function or outcome orderings [4]) forms a negotiation
scenario.
Individual preferences over specific scenarios provide the opportunity for joint
improvement and trade-offs [19]. The co-dependence between user and agent
requires that they synchronize their negotiation scenario model, which can be
enhanced by imparting the agent with accurate and timely user preferences
about the negotiation process and co-constructing the real-world intricacies of
the domain.
Preference Elicitation On-the-Fly. In order to faithfully represent the user,
an autonomous negotiator needs to engage with the user to make sure it con-
structs an accurate preference model (see e.g. [40]). However, users are often
unwilling or unable to engage with a negotiation system, and hence prudence
needs to be exercised when interacting with the user to avoid elicitation fatigue.
This is especially important in domains where people are notably reluctant to
engage with the system at length, for instance in privacy negotiations.
As a consequence, automated negotiators of the future are required to not
only strike deals with limited available user information, but also to assess which
additional information should be elicited from the user, while minimizing user
bother [6]. This challenge is still as relevant (and for the most part still unad-
dressed) as when it was raised by Jennings et al. in [42]. However, as a way
forward, we believe future research should particularly emphasize preference elic-
itation on-the-fly [7]: that is, active preference extraction during negotiation(s)
(see Fig. 2). Potential benefits include a significantly reduced initial preference
elicitation phase (which can otherwise be a nuisance in many negotiation sup-
port systems) and the ability to select the most informative query to pose to
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Fig. 2. A representative agent has a high uncertainty about the utility ux of a negotia-
tion outcome x ∈ Ω (in purple, prior to posing a query). Preference extraction through
a query q (e.g. “is ux > 0.5?”) can reduce this uncertainty, against certain user bother
cost, by distinguishing between bad outcomes (ux | no, in red) and good ones (ux | yes,
in blue). (Color figure online)
the user at the most relevant time. For example, while negotiating, the system
could dynamically decide to ask the user to rate specific negotiation outcomes,
or to compare two of them.
To facilitate this, new performance-based metrics are required that can assess
how supplementary preference information influences negotiation performance.
Adaptive utility elicitation models provide a good starting point for represent-
ing probabilistic utility-based preferences that allow for incremental updating
over time (e.g. by using Bayesian reasoning), in the vein of work by Chajewska
et al. [16]. To continuously balance the expected negotiation payoff with the
potential benefit of performing additional elicitation, the viability of a nego-
tiation query can for instance be measured in terms of the expected value of
information [12] in order to assess the marginal utility of altering belief states
and to decide if a query is worth posing.
Another challenge is for a negotiation strategy to decide on actions effec-
tively in light of its imprecise information state. Techniques for decision making
under uncertainty could assist in this and could thereby give rise to novel nego-
tiation strategy concepts, for instance by incorporating the notion of expected
expected utility [13] to express the expected negotiation payoff over all possible
instantiations of the user model.
Note that the above discussion largely follows the standard assumptions of
rational choice theory: i.e. that people’s preferences can be accurately elicited.
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Most approaches adopt the perspective that the value of possible agreements
is expressible by a (relatively) time- and context-invariant utility function over
material outcomes – we revisit this in Sect. 3.2. Unfortunately, several idiosyn-
crasies of human psychology complicate these assumptions. While preference-
elicitation methods can often extract coherent utility functions that capture
people’s rankings over possible agreements, people often have difficulty explic-
itly expressing their preferences. Further, a person’s willingness to accept an
agreement is also only partially determined by how they feel about the final
agreement; these feelings are also highly sensitive to contextual factors, such as
how the deal is reached and how it is described. Research on human negotiation
emphasizes that people attend to many factors besides the final outcome, as
identified, for example, by Curhan’s Subjective Value Inventory [20].
Research also illustrates that elicited utility functions are highly sensitive
to subtle contextual factors. For example, framing effects emphasize that pref-
erences between outcomes can reverse depending on whether they are seen as
losses or gains with respect to some reference point [70]. In a negotiation, the
reference point is often the perceived value that the other party receives, even
though this knowledge does not change the individual’s objective outcome. As
a result, outcomes can be readily manipulated simply by changing the form and
nature of information conveyed [31]. More broadly, valuations in a negotiation
are shaped by emotion, including emotions that arise from the process, but also
beliefs about what other parties feel (see, e.g., [10]). Given the highly context-
sensitive nature of on-the-fly preference elicitation, such considerations will have
to be taken into account in its design and implementation.
Domain Modeling. The quality of the negotiation outcome depends not only
on the faithfulness of the preference model of an autonomous negotiator, but
also on the accuracy of the domain model. The old ‘garbage in, garbage out’
truism applies here, as the quality of the offered solution depends so heavily on
a correct domain description.
However, domain modeling, and certainly formal modeling, is an expertise
that cannot be expected from an arbitrary user. Therefore, users require either
expert guidance, or explicit domain modeling support. Modeling in close coop-
eration with a domain expert runs the risk of perpetuating people’s uncertainty
about the model, thereby limiting their ability to make necessary adjustments.
When modeling support is provided by the system, the knowledge represen-
tation language used will be inherently simple as it has to be understood by
arbitrary negotiators. This is especially important in domains where users can
employ automated negotiation without any expertise, such as in the smart grid,
which can result in the wrong evaluation of bids. Highly accurate models, on
the other hand, also have their disadvantages: they can display complex non-
linearities [41,50], in which case even assessing the utility of a proposal can
prove NP-hard [21].
This inspires the following open research question: what is the impact of sim-
plifying the domain and preference models to facilitate layman understanding?
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An answer might come from using two models, as suggested in [37]: an accu-
rate, but complex model that serves as a reference for the agent, and a more
comprehensive one for interacting with the user. Proper clarification and expla-
nation could then be elicited from a process of co-creation [62] or participatory
design [65] between modeling experts and domain experts. Ideally, a reflection
phase should be included during and after negotiations, in which the human
(and perhaps eventually the agent) can provide feedback to allow for long-term
co-evolution.
The above points also apply to the appropriateness and understandability
of the negotiation protocol, which governs the rules of the negotiation. A pre-
negotiation phase provides the opportunity for the negotiation parties to engage
in a debate about what protocol to employ and how to enforce the rules. To
reduce the chance of parties exploiting loopholes in the rules, horizontal gover-
nance [68] approaches can be employed. Such techniques are applied in border
customs regulations, where the responsibility for fairness is carried by all par-
ticipants. A corresponding challenge is to construct a best practice repository
for negotiation techniques [42]. This has been tackled at least partially through
recent efforts in creating a negotiation handbook for negotiation protocols [52].
Whatever approach is chosen, experts in formal modeling will be needed to
instantiate a domain model that sufficiently captures all salient features. Those
experts are pivotal to the negotiation agent business model and will be respon-
sible for mapping user-understandable interests to the negotiation issues within
complex domains. These are likely to become future jobs; i.e., real estate agents
informing procurement agents of the future. Relevant research areas, and courses
for training these experts, will be on collaborative and supportive modeling.
3.2 Long-Term Perspective
Given the effort involved in domain modeling and preference elicitation, the
opportunities for automated negotiation are even clearer in long-term scenarios
where an agent frequently faces similar negotiation situations. Most research on
negotiation agents, however, has focused on single encounters. The different chal-
lenges and opportunities for such long-term negotiations hinge on the volatility
of both the opponent pool and the user’s preferences.
Repeated Encounters. Given the efforts required to obtain an accurate user
model, the benefits of autonomous agents become especially apparent when
repeatedly dealing with similar situations, as is the case when negotiating mul-
tiple times with the same set of opponents. Indeed, there are many promising
opportunities for applying negotiation in such repeated encounters. For example,
in community energy exchange [2], agents can trade energy from storage and local
renewable sources between neighboring homes and businesses to reduce peaks,
carbon emissions and the load on the local network. These interactions would
occur on a daily basis or even more frequently. Another example is the smart
home, where different occupants have different needs and preferences and have
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to reach mutual agreements, e.g. about the trade-off between comfort and energy
cost [59] and the use of IoT devices [57]. Other settings, in which the agent faces
many different opponents, include self-driving vehicles, where vehicle-to-vehicle
and vehicle-to-infrastructure negotiation will play an important role by, e.g.,
negotiating priority at intersections [71].
Negotiation opportunities for isolated encounters can be very limited, since
often a resource (e.g. electricity or giving way) is needed without necessarily
offering anything immediately in return (except possibly money or virtual cur-
rencies). In a single negotiation, the only truly interesting interactions revolve
around multi-issue negotiation in which trade-offs can be made between the
parties varying interests. However, explicitly considering the temporal dimen-
sion allows agents to receive or concede something now in return for conced-
ing or receiving the same resource later. In other words, sequential, distributive
negotiations can be turned into richer, multi-issue, integrative negotiations, with
more scope to achieve win-win solutions (as presented in [53]; see Fig. 3). This
is entirely analogous to how in single negotiations, package deals are more effi-
cient than settling the issues independently due to the possibility of making fair
trade-offs across issues [27]. Or likewise, how economic efficiency is enhanced
when combinations of assets rather than individual items are considered [23].
By carefully bundling interdependent issues together, the exponential complex-
ity of the resulting outcome space can in principle be mitigated (see e.g. [32]).
2, 3
Fig. 3. By considering the Cartesian product of the outcome spaces, two sequential,
distributive negotiations (one with 2 outcomes, in red; one with 3 outcomes, in blue)
can be transformed to produce one integrative negotiation (with 6 outcomes, in purple).
(Color figure online)
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Another significant challenge for long-term reciprocal encounters is that
future needs are often uncertain, and so it is difficult to commit to giving up or
requesting specific future resources. Possible solutions involve money or virtual
currencies which can be redeemed at a later stage and can undergo temporal dis-
counting if necessary, but they do not take advantage of the distributive nature of
multi-issue negotiation. They also introduce additional challenges: using actual
money requires an exchange rate with the resources involved (and other dimen-
sions such as the scarcity at the time they are requested), while it may not be
desirable to introduce money in certain settings; e.g. when they rely, to some
degree, on unincentivized cooperation and altruistic behavior. Virtual currencies
(including distributed ledger approaches) can be traded bilaterally in a “like for
like” manner, addressing the exchange problem, but then other issues arise, e.g.
how much of a currency each agent receives to begin with, and what happens if
an agent runs out.
Another possible solution is to rely on altruism and using trust ratings
and reputation metrics to provide the desired incentives (e.g. using favors and
ledgers [53]). In such cases, ‘altruism’ can be a self-interested strategy if this is
reciprocated at a later state, possibly involving a different opponent. While rep-
utation mechanisms are well-known to incentivize cooperation in the prisoner’s
dilemma, more research on this is needed in the context of (repeated) automated
negotiation.
Unfortunately, negotiation methods that seek to establish a value-creating
relationship by identifying efficient and fair (e.g., envy-free) agreements face,
in addition to the above, a number of psychological challenges. People adopt a
variety of interpretations as to what is fair and negotiations often involve disputes
over which principle to apply [73]. For example, in the context of organ donation,
the equity principle would allocate resources on the basis of ability, effort or
merit, the equality rule would treat individuals the same, whereas the principle
of need is achieved by allocating according to individuals medical condition,
socio-economical status or other relevant needs. Even people’s willingness to
engage in negotiation is shaped by their views toward these principles [55]. Other
complications involve moral constraints on certain exchanges. For example, it
is considered morally repugnant to exchange money for bodily organs, so an
agreement that combines material interests with sacred values may be seen as
substantially worse than an independent evaluation of these elements would
suggest [24].
Although these challenges might seem insurmountable, there are several ways
to incorporate these biases into conventional computational methods. One app-
roach is to incorporate psychological factors into the utility function, which can
be done without violating the basic tenets of utility theory [28]. Some of the chal-
lenges with fairness can be addressed by making the process more transparent
(Sect. 3.3). Another approach is to incorporate modest psychological extensions
to rational methods. For example, framing effects can be handled through the
use of prospect theory (e.g., [75]).
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Non-stationary Preferences. While short-lived instantiations of representa-
tional agents may assume that there are some true and stationary preferences
to be elicited from the user, in long-term negotiations, these very preferences
may evolve over the course of weeks or months according to certain preference
dynamics. For example, exposure to the view of wind generators can impact the
preference profile over various renewable generation types [47]. This is related
to the machine learning notion of concept drift, which expresses that statistical
properties of a target variable (e.g. in a data stream) may change over time,
possibly abruptly or gradually, which makes modeling challenging [69].
If an autonomous negotiator acts on elicited information for an extended
period of time without accounting for existing drift in preferences, it may erro-
neously fulfill outdated design objectives. This leads to a plunge in user trust
and adoption, or a de-facto shortened time of deployment. This is a typical
example of opacity that can result from an excess of unchecked autonomy [56].
As a result, long-term negotiation requires increased co-dependence at the cost
of throttled-down self-directedness; e.g., by repeated assessment of the prefer-
ence representation quality, with intermittent elicitation actions whenever their
anticipated benefits exceed their costs.
It is important to distinguish complex preference models from dynamic pref-
erences, albeit the two provide complementary views on the same process. In
representational negotiation, the target is to accurately model the users pref-
erences, which may be elicited at a cost, and which the user applies to judge
the agent’s performance. The user may perceive an exogenous evolution in her
preferences (e.g., in risk tolerance or fairness attitudes), or update her prefer-
ences actively based on experience – she thus maintains dynamic preferences,
that may themselves be learned over time. In contrast, the agent may employ
a complex preference model, describing user preferences dependent on possibly
uncertain user state variables. Changes in user preference may thus be ascribed
to updates in the belief over the user’s state, based on dynamics or observed
information. The crucial deviation from previous approaches is an acknowledg-
ment of the possibility that preferences may not settle, but remain in a state
of flux. Tracking can mitigate the effects of evolving negotiation preferences in
order to facilitate sustained representation [15].
Assuming non-stationary preferences reframes the challenge posed in Sect. 3.1
of preference elicitation to cost-efficient tracking of non-stationary preferences
in long-term negotiation. Possible applications range from secretary tasks
(e.g., ‘book a restaurant/hotel/holiday’) to representational business-to-business
(B2B) negotiations [58]. Inspiration for tackling this challenge may come from
the area of news recommender systems, which has embraced context-dependent
models [1] and preference dynamics [48] in response to the inherent need to
capture fast-paced preference evolution. Such models have promising merit for
being transfered to negotiation strategies that balance the preciseness of pref-
erence representation with relevant and timely but costly elicitation, extending
preliminary work in that area [7]. Reinforcement learning techniques could pro-
vide another possible route way by which to deal with this challenge by extending
research into negotiation with non-stationary opponents [36,54].
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Beyond the passive modeling of dynamic user preferences, an opportunity for
managing user preferences arises once a model of the user preference dynamics
is available, e.g. through nudges and manipulation of cognitive biases [11,30]. If
preferences are learned, then the agent can choose to guide the user’s experience
(with intermediate results of negotiated outcomes) to promote certain preference
profiles for which higher utility can be achieved in the long run.
3.3 User Trust and Adoption
While the agent depends on the user for knowledge and guidance (as described
in Sect. 3.1), the user relies on a self-directed agent for a good outcome. To
alleviate unwillingness to relinquish control and to guarantee user satisfaction
with and adherence to the final outcome, the user needs to trust the system
through co-participation, transparency, and proper representation.
User Participation. Lessons learned from collaborative human-robot teams
indicate that it is important to be able to escalate to the meta-level (i.e. have
humans participate) when necessary [43]. The need for escalating to a higher
authority applies whenever a negotiator represents a group or a company (e.g., a
union, or stakeholder organizations in general). In such cases, the negotiator can
only make deals that fall within certain margins. Take, for example, a helpdesk
operator with a telecom provider, authorized to offer new deals on a contract
renewal. She has only limited freedom in terms of the bounded range of possible
deals she can sign off on; in fact, she does not even really possess the freedom
to decide whether to negotiate. In case of doubt, the decision is escalated to a
different authority level.
Similar to preference elicitation on-the-fly, user escalation should only occur
through a minimum number of timely and pertinent questions (cf. [17,46,60]).
As automated negotiators become more general and domain-independent [49],
the need for a co-active design increases; i.e. one that requires the automated
negotiator to be aware of the strengths and weaknesses of itself and that of the
user, together with the ability to enhance the team model with domain-specific
knowledge, preferred strategies, and interpretation of incoming bids.
The idea of collaborative control, or mixed-initiative control (see e.g. [29,43])
might become essential to achieve the best outcome in complex, real-life nego-
tiations. In this envisioned line of research, each negotiation party consists of
at least one human and one negotiation agent. The agent should do the brunt
of the negotiation work to find possible agreements with the other negotiation
parties and which can presented to their human partners for feedback and new
input, which necessitates an understanding of their behavior [33], attitudes [77],
and preferred interaction method [61]. The research challenge is to determine
when, how, and how often to switch the initiative from human to agent and vice
versa.
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Transparent Consequences. There exists an inherent tension between
increased self-directedness and trust, which dampens the adoption of increas-
ingly autonomous negotiators: on the one hand, an autonomous negotiatior’s
relevance is directly proportional to its ability to impact the user independently
in meaningful ways (e.g. fiscal, well-being, reputation, and so on); but, in turn,
the user’s trust and willingness to relinquish control is conditional on under-
standing the agent’s reasoning and consequences of its actions. The two can be
reconciled by making the outcome space more transparent to the user, and by
enabling the user to specify the permissible means in the form of principles. The
challenge is that the negotiation agent’s reasoning abilities may very well exceed
the domain insights of a nonspecialist user, thus requiring a translation from sto-
chastic performance models of self-directed expert reasoning into laymen terms
that adequately convey expectations and risks.
Note that we suggest transparency as the key concept here, which subsumes
Jennings’ notion of predictability [42]. Predictability is essential towards the
user to instill trust, but can be disastrous towards the opponent because of
the potential for exploitability. Unpredictable behavior is in fact desirable as
a negotiation tactic as a confusing and randomization device, as long as the
consequences are transparently explained to the user.
The uncertainty inherent in negotiation can be captured in performance mod-
els and risk metrics, where the complexity should be scaled to the criticality of
the consequences for the user. If the performance intervals are sub-critical, then
simple guarantees on the range of possible outcomes may suffice (such as price
bounds provided by Uber for individual rides), leaving it up to the user to
build and judge the average performance model; otherwise, measures of risk are
required, such as Conditional Value at Risk (CVar) [64].
4 Concluding Observations
Autonomous systems that are capable of negotiating on our behalf are among
society’s key technological challenges for the near future, and their uptake is
important for many critical economical application areas. In this paper, we
present a roadmap to arrive at representative and trusted negotiators that are
endowed with a long-term perspective. By continuing along this trajectory, nego-
tiation research can address perhaps the biggest challenge of all: a co-active
approach that can propel swift adoption of computerized negotiation by simul-
taneously advancing the autonomy of a negotiation agent in all its aspects.
On the other hand, the sensitive nature of negotiation requires keeping a
watchful eye for potentially adverse effects of increased computer autonomy.
For instance, autonomous negotiators need to encapsulate information locally as
part of their decentralized nature, which entails an inherent privacy risk. Pri-
vacy concerns can be important enough to restrict negotiation information flow
to representative entities (as illustrated, for instance, by the leaked memo con-
troversy of Brexit negotiators [74]). This also means that even when it is possible
from a user’s comfort level, it is not necessarily desired to extract the maximum
Computers That Negotiate on Our Behalf 157
user knowledge possible. This reiterates the need for improved measures for the
value of information in negotiation; e.g. a metric that encapsulates the increased
value of accurate preference estimates to reach win-win outcomes. For example,
if a desire for maternity leave is inconsequential to the outcome (e.g. when it is
not part of the contract), it does not need to be known by the agent.
Another consideration is when negotiation (in the sense of exchanging offers
and counter offers) is the appropriate choice, and when other mechanisms can
or should be used. Often alternatives are available that could be more efficient
or simpler to use. These include auctions, which are especially fitting in cases
of competing settings and resource allocation problems, and voting protocols,
which are a good way of reaching agreements when a consensus is needed. These
approaches are often used in settings with only one issue to decide on (in case
of voting), or where the main issue is a monetary payment for a commodity
(in case of auctions). Another, much simpler, alternative to negotiation is to
offer an exhaustive menu of choices and allow the other player to pick one of
these (as in the case of e.g. insurance policies). The advantage of negotiation is
the ability to strategize over information revelation and to personalize deals by
reaching differentiated agreements over illiquid, customized contracts. If these
features of negotiation are not taken advantage of, then other approaches might
be preferable.
On a societal level, negotiation has potential benefits and costs. In terms
of benefits, negotiation allows for much more efficient allocation of resources
than fixed pricing schemes as it optimizes value with respect to an individ-
ual’s willingness-to-pay [38] rather than appealing to the “average customer”.
This helps to reach win-win outcomes and to get closer to what economists call
first-degree price discrimination. Negotiation has fallen out of favor in wealthier
societies because the time and anxiety associated with it, except for very costly
transactions such as salary negotiations and home purchases, yet automated
negotiation agents can mitigate these concerns and generate value for society
as a whole. Widespread adopting of negotiation technology could benefit mem-
bers of society that are reluctant or unable to negotiate effectively and could
potentially address friction costs as well as inequities across society. For exam-
ple, women are especially averse to negotiating their salaries and this is a major
contributor to gender pay inequality [9]. But negotiation technology could be
abused in ways that outweigh or even undermine these potential benefits. For
example, a benefit of fixed-pricing schemes is that they are transparent and
applied uniformly, regardless of a persons gender, race, income, or negotiation
skills. Indeed, Amazon’s attempts at price discrimination have provoked lawsuits
from consumer protection groups for exactly this concern [38]. More broadly, if
negotiation agents are only available to the wealthy, they could exacerbate exist-
ing societal injustice. Regulations and ethical guidelines are needed to balance
these benefits and costs.
In the end, the potency of autonomous negotiators is as much contin-
gent on the acceptance by their users as by their counter-parties. Possible
sources of resistance to adoption include established business models based on
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human inefficiencies (e.g., phone and media contracts) or anti-competitive prac-
tices (e.g., proprietary lock-in), which could become invalidated by autonomous
(re-)negotiation. The most promising incubators of autonomous negotiators are
ecosystems in which autonomous agents provide a unique source of societal
value that is distributed over all stakeholders, as in the application of demand
response for smart grids. Open platforms for value distribution have recently
seen increased attention in flagship applications such as the cryptocurrency bit-
coin and the decentralized world wide web Blockstack [3]. The digital API of
these systems offers fertile grounds for a level playing field for competition and
may soon provide a common interface for automated negotiators.
Finally, looking even further forward, it is worth noting that people negotiate
differently through intermediaries than they would face-to-face. The literature on
representation effects suggests that people may show less regard for fairness and
ethical behavior when negotiating through a third (human) party [18]. Indeed,
human lawyers are ethically permitted and, to some extent, expected to lie on
behalf of their clients [31]. This raises the question as to whether agents should
similarly lie on behalf of a user, e.g. by using argumentation and persuasion tech-
nology [25]. Analogous to recent research on ethical dilemmas in self-driving cars,
people may claim that negotiation agents should be ethical, but sacrifice these
ideals if it maximizes their profits. The natural dichotomy between recognizing
the agent’s autonomy and taking responsibility for its actions is best resolved by
acknowledging user responsibility for the agent’s design objectives (what should
be achieved) and principles (how it should be achieved, as discussed in Sect. 3.3).
This also illustrates an additional impetus for having humans understand the
agent: feeling responsibility for the agent’s actions implies an understanding
what the agent is doing. Fortunately, some recent research on agent negotia-
tors suggests that people may act more ethically when negotiating via computer
agents [22], but far more research is needed to understand how artificial repre-
sentation effects arise.
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